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A CRITIQUE OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MODEL OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
Thomas Clarke* 
 
I. Introduction: Varieties of Capitalism /Varieties of Inequality?  
 
There is a developing literature comparing different models of capitalism from alternative 
analytical frameworks highlighting the nature and extent of diverse forms of capitalism, their 
relative strengths and weaknesses, and the prospects for institutional diversity when confronted 
with growing pressures for international economic integration (Deeg and Jackson 2006). The 
varieties of capitalism thesis elaborated by Hall and Soskice (2001) adopts a firm centred 
approach focusing on the incentives for coordination; a wider typology of governance 
mechanisms in terms of social systems of production is offered by Hollingsworth and Boyer 
(1997); and a national business systems approach of Whitley (1999) examines the internal 
capacities of business firms.  
 
The varieties of capitalism literature has great resonance in the consideration of comparative 
corporate governance. For more than a decade an intense debate has continued concerning the 
globalization and convergence of corporate governance (Hansmann and Kraakerman 2001; 
Branson 2001; McDonnell 2002; McCahery et al 2002; Hamilton and Quinlan 2005; Clarke 
2004; 2007). 
 
The question of whether economies will converge towards a common corporate Anglo-American 
governance system, or sustain the present diversity of institutions is one of the key issues facing 
countries in  Europe, the Asia Pacific and throughout the rest of the world. Lower economic 
growth and higher unemployment in Europe compared to the Anglo-American countries since 
the mid-1990s, undermined some of the confidence in Europe’s social model (though by 2005 
Germany had returned to its former position as the world’s largest exporter).  Despite the 
pressures towards adopting Anglo-Saxon modes of corporate governance, the divergences in 
both the policy and practice of corporate governance in Europe have thus far resisted any move 
towards European standards. However with greater market integration and the developing 
influence of Anglo-American institutional investors, it is possible the market will play a greater 
role. Yet debates on company law harmonisation in the European Union have been held up by 
countries not wishing to see elements of their own systems of corporate governance disappear in 
the process. One explanation for this impasse is the institutional complementarity thesis which 
justifies the continuing diversity of systems, rejecting the ‘one-best-way’ strategy adopted by the 
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‘convergence thesis.’ Instead a plurality of models is assumed, each corresponding to local 
circumstances, supported by a cluster of social norms and regulation, enabling balanced 
economic development. As Reberioux argues what is often presented as the practical economic 
inevitability of convergence, is in essence a profoundly ideological and political argument: 
 
“Two competing theories behind forms of corporate governance can thus be discerned. In the 
first case, the US model – the predominance of widely held corporations controlled by their 
owners – is presented as optimal. If one adds a general law that institutions are evolving toward 
efficiency, then one obtains the convergence thesis: the European system is bound to change in 
the direction of the Anglo-Saxon one; it is only a matter of time. From a neo-institutionalist 
perspective, this process of convergence is seen as the result of rational micro-behaviour by 
individuals when crafting their governance structure (Williamson 1995)…Without delving 
further into a complex debate, it is worth noting that the micro-efficiency of shareholder value 
has not yet been proved, and probably never will be. The fundamental reason is that shareholder 
sovereignty is not an efficient arrangement, but rather a power relationship,  that is a particular 
(societal) way to design a corporation…The institutional complementarity thesis provides a 
contrasting perspective on the continuing diversity of capitalist systems (Amable 2000). The core 
of this theoretical approach is a rejection of the ‘one best way’ strategy adopted by the 
convergence thesis in analysing institutions. Rather, a plurality of models is assumed, each 
corresponding to local circumstances. The focus should not be upon a particular (isolated) 
institution, but on the cluster of social norms that underpin national regulation. This societal 
approach emphasises the systemic links between institutions that enable balanced economic 
development” (2000:117-8).  
 
The diversity of corporate models is valuable and is rooted in societal characteristics that 
together shape the competitiveness of the different models. Though shareholder value may be 
gaining ground due to the influence of Anglo-Saxon institutional investors, a stakeholder 
approach is closer to the reality of European social democracies, and the outcome of the 
confrontation between the two competing philosophies is highly uncertain. It is unlikely that 
imported Anglo-Saxon capital market related features of corporate governance will work well 
with Continental labour-related aspects of corporate governance as represented in supervisory 
boards. It is likely any such European compromise would be more unstable than existing systems 
(Reberioux 2000; Cernat 2004). 
 
A more pessimistic view is offered by Christel Lane (2003) who reviews the evidence on the 
German case and concludes that a new Anglo-American logic of corporate governance is 
diffusing beyond the major corporations of the DAX 30, and that this is not simply attributable to 
external constraints, but to powerful actors within the German economy including large banks 
and insurance companies. This is significant firstly because Germany has been the paradigm for 
the model of co-ordinated capitalism as distinct from competitive or liberal market capitalism. If 
the cohesive German system is in the process of fundamental change, then other continental 
European business systems are likely to be vulnerable. Secondly Lane argues it is wrong to 
assume the adoption of the Anglo-American model is simply about changes in capital markets 
and corporate financing: 
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“Because forms of corporate governance structure most other relationships within firms and even 
in society as a whole, they are inherently connected with a distribution of power and material 
welfare. They therefore decisively shape the logic of the whole political economy. Hence there is 
strong concern, particularly but not only on the part of labour, with the consequences of change 
for the distribution of surplus and control to various stakeholders in the firm, as well as the future 
viability of the production paradigm of diversified quality production.” 
  
Pursuing Lane’s perspective this paper focuses on how different varieties of capitalism with 
different logics of political economy produce different levels of inequality. Specifically the paper 
examines how the Anglo-American variant of corporate governance in its US manifestation has 
afforded CEOs of large corporations inordinate power and wealth, and the consequences of this 
for inequality in the wider society. Yet this is precisely the model of capitalism that is being 
propagated most vigorously in other regions of the world by executives themselves, large 
international corporations, institutional investors, and international agencies such as the OECD 
and IMF. This dynamic induced the present international financial crisis, in which investment 
bank executives were massively incentivised to pursue vast securitization and leverage which 
hugely enriched themselves, but caused the collapse of financial institutions worldwide, and the 
violent instability of financial markets. The social consequences of this reckless financial 
irresponsibility in terms of structural damage to international economies, government 
programmes and unemployment remains to be calculated. 
 
II. US CEO POWER AND REWARD 
 
The person increasingly at the centre of defining and projecting the responsibilities and 
objectives of the corporation in the Anglo-American mode of corporate governance is the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO). The position of CEO has grown in status and public recognition as 
corporations have become larger and more powerful and extended their reach globally. The 
leadership qualities of CEOs are celebrated in business bookshops in the way once reserved for 
statesmen, generals or explorers. Among the qualities expected of CEOs is the vision to see a 
new future for the corporation (a sage CEO once said there is a hair’s breadth difference between 
a vision and an hallucination), and as John Harvey-Jones the former CEO of ICI described it  the 
capacity to make things happen.  As CEO of Disney Michael Eisner made things happen when in 
1998 he appropriated a total compensation package of $576 million. (This was greater than the 
combined compensation of all 100 CEOs of the FTSE 100 companies at the time, and greater 
than the combined salaries of similar large groups of CEOs of leading companies in other parts 
of the world). 
 
Though the board of directors is invested with the responsibility for the company in law, the 
practical reality is often that the CEO is very much in charge. In the United States CEOs 
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accumulated power to themselves as their corporations began to dominate world markets in the 
middle decades of the 20th century, and the role of the board was marginalised: “Corporate 
boards, asserts legal tradition, are the sovereigns of their realm. But until they began to flex their 
muscles during the 1990s, boards rarely behaved that way, leaving most decisions in the hands of 
management (Lorsch and MacIver 1989; Useem 1996). State corporation laws that assign 
ultimate responsibility for company affairs to the governing body permit directors to delegate the 
running of the company to management. The problem is that, until recently, management’s 
power in large American companies reflected less a deliberate delegation of authority by a 
sovereign body than a de facto reality in which management had become dominant, effectively 
controlling the agenda of the board to which it was only nominally subordinate.” (Useem and 
Zelleke 2006:2) 
 
Chief executives used their control of boards not only to prevent any challenge to their position, 
but to aggregate to themselves an increasing share of the wealth generated by the company, both 
in terms of rapidly inflating salaries, and massively growing stock options. “A comparative 
perspective underscores the immense power, charisma and leadership given in the US corporate 
governance system to the chief executive officer (CEO), who usually also exercises the role of 
chairman of the board. In fact, in the USA, the split of these two roles is generally perceived as a 
transitional arrangement or a sign of weakness, particularly in the case of new outside CEOs. 
The over-centralisation of power in the CEO is evident in the gap between the CEO’s salary and 
that of other executives” (Aguilera 2005:45; Khurana 2002) 
 
A. ESPRIT DE CORPS  
 
An all-embracing esprit de corp is often encouraged in boards, and may well assist in 
maintaining collegiality and commitment among board members, but this can be misused by  
over-powerful CEOs who manipulate boards to prevent any challenge to their power or 
autonomy: “Among large US corporations there are strong disincentives, rather than incentives, 
for non-executive directors to challenge executives or to adopt corporate governance reforms that 
will limit managerial autonomy. These disincentives come from the social pressure to maintain 
managerial autonomy and authority for the elite of corporate leaders. Qualitative studies suggest 
that senior managers and directors of large established corporations have a shared group 
consciousness as members of a unified corporate leader elite” (Wei Shen (2005:84; Useem 
1984). Westphal and Khanna’s (2003:387) survey of Forbes 500 companies in the US discovered 
evidence that non-executive directors experience social sanctions by their peer directors if they 
are perceived to threaten the elite position by advocating: 
• The separation of CEO and chairman positions 
• The creation of independent nominating committees 
• The repeal of poison pill protection 
• The dismissal of the CEO. 
Similarly in the UK the sway of CEOs means that executive directors at least are unlikely to 
express policy disagreements with their boss at board meetings, as one non-executive director 
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commented: “The executive directors of boards have very little awareness of their 
responsibilities under company law or any other law, and the reason for that is quite 
understandable: they owe their jobs, careers and futures to the chief executive. He appoints them. 
If they are going to have an argument with the chief executive or differences of opinion on 
policy, which occur all the time, that has to be off board” (McNulty, Roberts and Stiles 2003:11). 
 
B. MANAGEMENT AND BOARD DEFENCES 
 
The commitment to a resolute espirit de corps may readily develop into a determined 
entrenchment of management and boards in the face of a potential hostile takeover. 
Managerialist theory argues that though shareholders should make the ultimate decision 
regarding takeovers, in fact control is effectively in the hands of top management who dominate 
the board of directors and proxy voting machinery to ensure their continued rule (Herman 1981). 
However in the 1980s in the United States a confluence of factors including the availability of 
large amounts of loan capital, and new financial instruments such as junk bonds (bonds with low 
credit ratings), and relaxed regulation of the anti-trust laws, suddenly large corporations that 
previously thought themselves invulnerable became takeover targets. This reinvigorated market 
for corporate control, it was thought provided a means to re-establish the link between ownership 
and control. Hostile takeovers it was argued, played a role in corporate governance by bringing 
purportedly efficient market pressures to bear on poorly performing managers (Goldstein 
2000:381). In fact managers themselves had found merger and takeover activity an easier route 
to growing their companies, but now this method of acquisition came back to bite them in the 
assault of hostile takeovers. “In historical perspective the corporate raiders of the 1980s were 
capitalizing on a transformation of the relation between finance and industry in the United States 
that had been going on since the 1950s. Paving the way for the financial revolution of the 1980s 
was the growing tendency  of strategic managers of the US industrial corporations to reap their 
own personal rewards  through participation in the market for corporate control rather than 
through enhancing the value creating capabilities of the companies that they were entrusted to 
manage”(Lazonick 1992:473). 
 
But for top managers hostile takeovers presented the stigma of unemployment, and for workers 
and surrounding communities the consequences of takeover battles can be devastating as both 
sides expend enormous resources on investment bank and advisers fees, and can often only 
recover from the debt accumulated in any restructuring activity intended to impress financial 
markets by slashing costs including employment. Yet for shareholders such takeovers offer the 
prospect of windfall gains. “Thus, the bustling market for corporate control in the 1980s 
threatened the autonomy previously enjoyed by top managers of large corporations as well as the 
relationships such firms had developed with their employees and communities, and it 
exacerbated the potential for conflict between shareholders and managers ..” (Davis 1991:584). 
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Responding to this threat top management and boards took protective action to make takeovers 
difficult without their consent. An ingenious array of shark repellents was created as barriers to 
hostile takeover. Corporate charter amendments to protect against takeover have many forms but 
among the most common are the classified board provision; the supermajority provision; and the 
fair price provision. The classified board provision introduces staggered board elections, making 
it impossible for a new majority shareholder ousting the board and replacing it entirely in a 
single election. The supermajority provision raises the minimum number of shareholder votes 
necessary for a takeover or merger approval to two thirds or three quarters. The fair price 
provision requires board approval of a takeover or the acquirer pays a minimum price for all 
remaining shares. The poison pill or shareholder rights plan is a security issued as a dividend to 
existing shareholders that entitles the holder to purchase shares in the firm at a deep discount if a 
takeover attempt occurs without board approval, dramatically increasing the cost a potential 
acquirer would have to pay to get control of the company. When the Delaware Supreme Court in 
November 1985 legitimated the adoption of a poison pill by boards, without shareholder 
approval, when the firm was not at the time threatened by a takeover attempt, the adoption of 
poison pills rocketed (Davis 1991:589). 
Restored to their entrenched position, CEOs in the US were well placed to personally capitalize 
on the renewed growth of the new economy. 
 
C. CEO PAY IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
During the boom years of the 1990s there was a rapid and sustained escalation in CEO salaries in 
the United States, and any expected adjustment downwards in executive reward with the market 
crash of 2001, and the halving of the market capitalisation of many large corporations, did not 
occur. Though there were more stringent efforts to link CEO compensation to performance, CEO 
reward remained at incredibly high levels whether the companies they managed did well or not. 
Extremely lucrative share option schemes continued, and if the options packages became more 
sophisticated, there were many devices such as backdating widely employed to ensure executives 
extracted the best possible reward from their options.  
 
Table 1     US Highest Paid CEOs in 2006 
Table 2     European Highest Paid CEOs in 2006 
 
Looking at the extremes of this profligacy, Table 1 indicates the total remuneration of the ten 
highest paid CEOs in public corporations in the US in 2006, and in contrast the total 
remuneration of the ten highest paid CEOs in European listed public corporations is given in 
Table 2. Included in the compensation figures are base salary, bonuses, benefits, long term 
incentive plans, and profits from cashing out on stock options where this information was 
accessible. The inflation of US CEO salaries relative to their colleague CEOs in Europe, is 
demonstrated by the fact that the US average top CEO salary is almost three times greater than 
their counterparts in Europe. While these comparisons are inevitably crude since much 
compensation of different forms is hidden in the US, and probably more so in other countries, 
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these astonishing disparities are an indication of how out of control US CEOs reward has been 
for a long time.  
 
CEO salaries are only a part of wider structures of inequality that have become more extreme in 
recent years, and rewards for executives in the finance sector have become even more 
astronomically inflated: James Simons the Director of Renaissance Technologies received $1.5 
billion in compensation in 2006, Steven Cohen of SAC Capital received $1.2 billion, Kenneth 
Griffin of Citadel Investment Group also received $1.2 billion, T.Boone Pickens of BP Capital 
picked up $1.1 trillion, and George Soros earned a modest $950 million. While CEOs of 
corporations might be criticized for putting their self-interest before that of the companies they 
manage, the directors of fringe financial institutions appear to have manipulated and destabilized 
world markets to secure even greater personal reward (IPS 2007; Soros 2008). Whatever loss 
occurs to shareholder funds due to excessive CEO salaries in U.S. corporations and financial 
institutions the wider implications of this extravagance are more serious, in terms of how the 
corporations are managed, the objectives they pursue, and the consequences for the wider 
economy and community. 
 
D. DISPLACEMENT OF GOALS 
 
An insidious indicator of the extent of management entrenchment in U.S. corporations is the 
rapid escalation of CEO and executive remuneration regardless of performance. Though equity 
based reward was intended to align executives with shareholders interests, the explosion of 
executive share options suggests in this respect management of is out of control of either boards 
or shareholders (Figure 1). William McDonough, the then President of the New York Federal 
Reserve Board in a speech in 2002 captured the sentiments of many regarding this reckless 
inflation of executive reward: 
 
“I believe there is one issue in particular which requires corrective action. A recent study shows 
that, 20 years ago, the average Chief Executive Officer of a publicly-traded company made 42 
times more than the average production worker. Perhaps, one could justify that by the additional 
education required, the greater dedication, perhaps even the harder work. The same study shows 
that the average present day CEO makes over 400 times the average employee’s income. It is 
hard to find somebody more convinced than I of the superiority of the American economic 
system, but I can find nothing in economic theory that justifies this development. I am old 
enough to have known both the CEO’s of 20 years ago and those of today. I can assure you that 
we CEO’s of today are not 10 times better than those of 20 years ago.” 
 
Figure 1 Median CEO Pay in the US 1980-2001 
The job of CEO is a very demanding one and needs to be rewarded to attract talented people and 
to offer them material incentives for staying committed to a tough role. However as McDonough 
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argues this was always the case, long before the current excessive rewards were offered. The 
essential problem is not the absolute growth in CEO reward, it is firstly how the arrogation of an 
increasing share of the wealth of the corporations by the CEO impacts upon relationships with 
other employees, shareholders, and the wider community. The second concern is how excessive 
and unrestrained CEO compensation displaces the CEOs objectives from the development and 
success of the company to individual strategies of how to maximise their personal earnings.  
 
This displacement of CEO goals is not a recent problem but occurred in earlier periods in 
different forms, for example in earlier periods of merger and takeover activity, often the most 
insistent driver was CEOs ambition, since they associated acquisitions with higher rewards for 
themselves. Similarly the sustained lack of capital investment in US and UK  industry in the 
1970s and 1980s was partly due to the self-interest of management: “The problem was not only 
the high cost and mobility of capital. The problem was also the willingness of many top 
managers of industrial corporations to take advantage of the permissive financial environment to 
appropriate huge levels of compensation for themselves while neglecting to build organizational 
capabilities in the companies they were supposed to be lead” (Lazonick (1992:476). 
 
There is much evidence to support the view that presently in large corporations in the United 
States: 
i. Executive compensation has been completely out of control for some time; 
ii. The disparity created with the rewards of other company workers is both morally 
unconscionable and functionally damaging; 
iii. Executives are taking an increasing share of the earnings of corporations, and are 
becoming significant shareholders in their own right; 
iv. Executive compensation in the past has often not been due to achieving results but 
has amounted to rewards for failure; 
v. The elaborate structures designed to link executive reward to performance has often 
compounded the problems rather than alleviating them; 
vi. There is a real danger that the excessive compensation secured by U.S. executives 
will become the benchmark for executive reward in other regions of the world where 
up till now executive rewards have remained modest in comparison. 
 
Excessive executive compensation in large U.S. corporations is not an isolated problem, it is 
endemic, and it has occurred because executives seized control of their own reward structures, as 
Bebchuk and Fried argue “Managerial power has played a key role in shaping executive pay. The 
pervasive role of managerial power can explain much of the contemporary landscape of 
executive compensation, including practices and patterns that have long puzzled financial 
economists. ..Managerial influence over the design of pay arrangements has produced 
considerable distortions in the arrangements, resulting in costs to investors and the economy. The 
influence has led to compensation schemes that weaken managers’ incentives to increase firm 
value and even create incentives to take actions that reduce long-term value…Flawed 
compensation arrangements have not been limited to a small number of ‘bad apples’; they have 
been widespread, persistent and systemic. Furthermore, the problems have not resulted from 
temporary mistakes or lapses of judgement that boards can be expected to correct on their own; 
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rather they have stemmed from structural defects in the underlying governance structure that 
enables executives to exert considerable influence over their boards. The absence of effective 
arm’s-length dealing under today’s system of corporate governance has been the primary source 
of problematic compensation arrangements. Finally, while recent reforms that seek to increase 
board independence will likely improve matters, they will not be sufficient to make boards 
adequately accountable; much more needs to be done” (2005:1-2) 
 
III. COMPOUNDING INEQUALITY 
 
More critical than the detachment of US executives from their shareholders interests that 
occurred in the 1990s, was the distance that grew between the rewards and lifestyle of executives 
and their employees. In 1980 the ratio of CEO and worker compensation in the US was 
approximately 50:1 in the S & P 500 companies, and by 1990 this had risen to a ratio of 107:1. 
With the meteoric rise in executive pay in the 1990s the ratio expanded to an unprecedented 
525:1 (Institute for a Fair Economy 2006; Ertuk et al 2005). Though there was productivity 
growth during this era almost all the benefits went to top management: As Dew-Becker and 
Gordon who examined the distribution of the benefits of growth in the U.S. comment “Our 
results show the dominant share of real income gains accruing to the top 10 percent and top 1 
percent is almost as large for labour income as total income...It is not that all gains went to 
capital and none to labour; rather, our finding is that the share of gains that went to labour went 
to the very top of the distribution of wage and salary incomes” (2005:77). In two decades US 
workers saw no measurable improvement in their wages, while US executives enjoyed the 
experience of becoming multi-millionaires en masse. This is hardly a recipe for a well integrated 
and orderly economy and society, and it is not surprising that the US now has among the worst 
social and health problems of any advanced industrial country (Figure 2). 
Figure 2 Comparison of CEO and Worker Pay in the US 1980-2002 
 
Among the arguments used to justify the enormous increases in US CEO reward are the effects 
of the bull market and the greater demands made upon executives, when it could be argued 
greater demands are actually made upon executives when the market is falling (Bebchuk and 
Grinstein 2005:299). A further argument put is that in these competitive times greater rewards 
are required as an incentive to executives, when there is little evidence that reward has been 
effectively linked to CEOs own performance. It appears that neither boards or shareholders have 
been able to prevent an unprecedented inflation in US executive reward which Bebchuck and 
Grinstein calculate cost US$250 billion for the top five executives in all US listed corporations 
between 1993-2002, and saw the earnings of the top five executives as a proportion of aggregate 
firm earnings rise from 5% in 1993 to 12.8% in 2000-2002 (Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005:297). 
When shareholder returns collapsed dramatically in 2001/2002, lavish CEO compensation in the 
S&P 500 continued regardless; and CEO compensation per dollar of net profit between 1960 and 
2000 increased exponentially (Economist 25 October 2003). 
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Furthermore given the extensive opportunities for executives to translate earnings into stock they 
have become major shareowners in their own companies. Holderness et al (1999) compared a 
cross section of 1,500 U.S. public companies in 1935 with a modern benchmark of 4,200 listed 
firms in 1995. They discovered that managerial ownership of common stock rose from 13 
percent in 1935 to 21 percent in 1995. It seems the separation of ownership and control is now in 
reverse, and Core et al (2003:53) estimate the current levels of inside ownership at U.S. public 
corporations at 20 percent. A large proportion of these shares are owned by CEOs, and Mehran 
(1995) records average ownership by the CEO and his immediate family of 5.9 per cent for 153 
randomly selected manufacturing firms, which in many cases would make them one of the 
largest shareholders. One of the intellectual inspirations for the new incentive pay structures for 
management was a paper by Jensen and Murphy (1990) that insisted executives needed to see 
more alignment between their performance and reward. Yet most of the consequent movement to 
incentivise management has achieved the opposite of the intended effect. In their research on the 
growth in executive pay Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005a) conclude that executive pay during 
1993-2003 grew by far more than could be explained by changes in firm size, performance and 
industry mix. In a further paper they discover “an asymmetry between increase and decreases in 
size: while increases in firm size are followed by higher CEO pay, decreases in firm size are not 
followed by reduction in such pay” (Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005b:1). 
 
Essentially the extraordinary elevation in executive reward that occurred in the 1990s in the 
United States had little to do with the productive efforts of the executives themselves, and was 
fuelled by the longest running bull market in history. The sustained rise in share prices in this 
period reflected institutional savings flows and momentum investing, together with falling 
interest rates. Stock options became an accelerator mechanism providing risk free bonuses to 
senior management. “Corporate governance in the 1990s operated against a background of rising 
share prices, the capital market was not an agent of discipline but a facilitator  of painless general 
enrichment though rising share prices; amidst increasing confusion about what management 
could do in a world whose stock market was running on narratives (not discounted cash flows) 
and encouraging CEOs to pose as heroes…Many CEOs in the decade of the 1990s profited 
personally from using the language of value creation to cover the practice of value skimming. 
Right at the end of the 1990s, just before the collapse of the Tyco share price and his personal 
disgrace, Denis Kozlowski, the Tyco CEO publicly defended his 1999 pay by claiming ‘while I 
gained $139 million (in stock options) I created $37 billion in wealth for our shareholders’ ” 
(Erturk 2005:690).  
 
Though the collapsing share market in 2001/2002 exposed acute problems of corporate 
governance and strategy, and raised serious questions regarding the performance and reward of 
corporate executives, most bloated executive pay packets escaped largely unscathed. Indeed on 
the occasions when executives were dismissed for poor performance, it was often discovered that 
they had gilt edged pension entitlements that rewarded them massively for their failure, stealth 
compensation that may include hidden pension entitlements, deferred compensation 
arrangements, and post-retirement consulting.  This prompted the UK Department of  Trade and 
Industry to publish its document on Rewards for Failure (2003) on director’s remuneration, 
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contracts, performance and severance, and alerted institutional investors to start checking the 
small print of executive’s contracts more closely. 
 
Among the many reasons why executive compensation packages have not delivered performance 
improvement, but often exacerbated the provision of increasing amounts of corporate earnings 
regardless of the contribution of the CEO, include the fact that behind the appearance of 
independence of compensation committees and the employment of external consultants, 
company directors have formed positive beliefs about types of pay arrangements from which 
they themselves have benefited during their management career (similarly compensation 
consultants enjoyed higher fees to the degree they can justify higher pay for the executives of the 
companies they are advising). Executive pay inflation has consistently been driven by boards 
seeking to pay their CEO more than the industry average, thus serving to progressively ratchet up 
the average. “A review of reports of compensation committees in large companies indicates that 
a large majority of them used peer groups to determine pay and set compensation at or above the 
50th percentile of the peer group. Such ratcheting is consistent with a picture of boards that do 
not seek to get the best deal for their shareholders, but are happy to go along with whatever can 
be justified as consistent with prevailing practices” Bebchuk and Fried (2005:13).  
 
When companies do use objective criteria these criteria are not designed to reward managers for 
their own contribution to the firm’s performance, as bonuses are typically not based on the firm’s 
operating performance or earnings increases relative to its industrial peers, but on metrics that 
cannot distinguish the contribution of industry wide or market wide movements. In fact 
conventional stock options allowed executives to gain from any increase in stock price above the 
grant-date market value, even when their company’s performance might have significantly 
lagged that of their peers. Towards the end of the 1990s CEOs became adept at achieving 
temporary spikes in the company’s stock price to release the maximum benefit from stock 
options, even when their companies long term stock performance was poor (Bebchuk and Fried 
2005:23-24). In addition a panoply of ways have been learned to further boost executive 
unearned reward through stock options including backdating (the widespread practice of 
adjusting stock option grant dates to an earlier time than they were actually granted in order to 
provide a windfall to the option holder); spring-loading, the practice of scheduling an option 
grant before the release of positive corporate news, anticipating a rise in the stock price and 
attempting a maximum boost to the value of the stock option; and bullet-dodging, the practice of 
delaying a grant until after negative news is released and a company’s stock price has declined. 
The problem with all of these tricks is that they are “bound up with concepts of insider trading” 
as Christopher Cox, the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission referred to spring-
loading in testimony before a Senate Committee on 6 September 2006. 
 
Table 3    Comparison of CEO Compensation and Ratio of CEO to Worker Pay 1998-2005 
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The out of control inflation in executive pay in the United States threatens to impact upon 
executive reward internationally. In the past there was some resistance to this, when the first 
President Bush took a large party of U.S. executives to Japan to examine the reasons why U.S. 
industry had failed to compete in the 1980s, the first suggestion of the Japanese executives to 
their American counterparts was, “why don’t you try paying yourselves less money?” (At the 
time Japanese executive salaries in manufacturing industries were a small fraction of U.S. 
salaries, and have remained modest in comparison). Today many European and Asian executives 
look upon swollen U.S. executive salaries more as a benchmark to aspire towards. Already a 
higher proportion of executive pay is being offered in equity-based compensation and in 
incentive payments in other parts of the world, which were significant stages in the acceleration 
of the inflation of U.S. executive pay. As Table 3 reveals, though US CEO compensation across 
a sample of 350 large public companies remains more than double the reward of CEOs drawn 
from similar samples of public companies in other advanced industrial countries, the rate of 
growth of CEO compensation in many other countries in the last decade exceeds that of the 
United States.  
 
A. EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION REFORM 
 
In 2006 a survey of 768 directors in the 2,000 largest U.S. corporations by Heidrick and 
Struggles and the USC Marshall School of Business, nearly 40 percent of directors said CEO pay 
was “too high in most cases,” and yet 64 percent of directors expected to see continued increases 
in cash compensation, and 58 percent expected an increase in stock-based compensation 
(2006:1). Nevertheless efforts continue to be made to make executive reward systems more 
rigorous and to eliminate fundamental problems such as mismatched time horizons and the 
gaming that can lead to fraudulent accounting (Hall 2003). Bebchuk and Fried (2005) 
recommend a series of measures to increase the transparency of executive pay arrangements 
including placing a dollar value on all forms of compensation, and to include these amounts in 
compensation reports; expensing options to make the costs more visible to investors; and 
reporting how much executive remuneration results from general market and industry 
movements. They recommend strengthening the link between pay and performance by reducing 
windfalls in equity-based compensation, filtering out gains in stock price due to general market 
movements; attaching bonuses to long term performance rather than short term accounting 
results, and including ‘clawback’ provisions if accounting numbers are subsequently restated; not 
paying for simply expanding the company through acquisition; and avoiding soft landing for 
executives where generous exit packages eliminates any gap between the rewards of good and 
poor performance.  
However executive reward will remain an issue when there are questions regarding boards’ 
accountability, and CEOs dominating influence over boards. More fundamentally it may be 
questioned whether executive performance pay should be in the form of stock options at all, 
since these create an incentive for management to manage performance of financial results in 
order to maximise share price. Pay for performance might better be linked to the underlying 
drivers of performance that impact on the financials, and to non-financial performance indicators 
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in a more balanced scorecard. The focus could then be upon management for sustainability, 
rather than short term performance management aimed at the stock price.  
 
Figure 3      Distribution of Stock Market Holdings by Wealth Class 
 
B. ADVANCING INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation routinely claimed each year by the leading 
U.S. business and financial leaders has to be put into the perspective that although the United 
States is the most prosperous country on earth, it is typified by mounting, severe and very visible 
inequality. While CEO salaries inflated through the roof, in recent years average earnings in 
America actually went down. Looking at the distribution of stock market holdings in the United 
States, the richest 1% of the population own 36.9% of these assets, and the richest 10% own 
79%, in contrast 80% of the population own only 9.4% of these assets (Figure 3). The campaign 
for shareholder value of the last 20 years may be reinterpreted in this light. Looking at the boom 
time of the 1990s the advancing prosperity in the US hardly touched most of the population, and 
the meagre gains they made have been lost since 2001. Some would defend this extreme level of 
inequality as the price of incentives and performance, but given the awful impact on the quality 
of most people’s lives, it hardly makes the Anglo-American model as attractive as it is often 
portrayed by the rich and famous who have benefited from it (EPI 2008).The groundswell of 
opposition to this increasing poverty in the US economy and society led to the emphatic election 
of Barak Obama as President of the United States. 
 
Figure  4       World Exchange Market Capitalization (US $trillion) 
 
IV. THE 2008 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
  “America’s financial institutions have not managed risk; 
  they have created it” (Joseph Stiglitz 2008a) 
 
The apparent ascendancy of Anglo-American markets and governance institutions was 
profoundly questioned by the scale and contagion of the 2008 global financial crisis. The crisis 
originated in Wall Street where de-regulation unleashed highly incentivised investment banks to 
flood world markets with toxic financial products. As the accumulated cost of the financial crisis 
was realised the commitment to establish a new international financial regulatory framework 
increased. The market capitalisation of the stock markets of the world had peaked at $62 trillion 
at the end of 2007, followed by a calamitous fall to $33 trillion by October 2008 (Figure 4), as 
derivatives markets that had reached $500 trillion dollars unwound.  The general market 
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assistance and specific rescue packages for individual financial institutions amounted to almost 
$4 trillion worldwide by October 2008 (Table 4). As the financial crisis impacted upon the real 
economy the fears of a prolonged recession grew, with US industrial production falling further 
than it had for over 30 years, and for example the US automotive industry becoming increasingly 
precarious announcing further major redundancies and looking for support from the federal 
government. The International Labour Organisation in Geneva estimated that up to 20 million 
people in the world would lose their employment as a consequence of the financial crisis, and 
that for the first time in  a decade the global total of unemployed would be above 200 million 
(Associated Press, 21 October 2008). 
 
Table 4 Government Support for Global Financial Crisis 2008 
 
The explanation of why investment banks and other financial institutions took such spectacular 
risks with extremely leveraged positions on many securities and derivatives, and the risk 
management, governance and ethical environment that allowed such conduct to take place is 
worth further analysis. With the recovery of US financial markets after the Enron debacle, the 
explosion of financial innovation gave the world a new breed of Masters of the Universe in the 
derivatives dealers and hedge fund managers who manipulated trillions of dollars, while 
charging immense fees. This long financial boom of recent years saw the culture of financial 
excess permeate through swathes of the rich industrial countries as people were encouraged to 
live on debt.  
 
A. INCENTIVISATION 
 
The most critical part of the explanation of why investment banks and other financial institutions 
took such extreme risks with highly leveraged positions in complex securities, neglecting risk 
management, governance principles and often basic business ethics was that they were 
incentivised to do so. Massively incentivised irresponsibility became the operating compensation 
norm in the financial community, as banks and fringe financial institutions chased the super 
profits available as global financial markets expanded exponentially. “The management teams at 
the investment banks did exactly what they were incentivized to do: maximize employee 
compensation. Investment banks pay out 50% of revenues as compensation. So, more leverage 
means more revenues, which means more compensation. In good times, once they pay out the 
compensation, overhead and taxes, only a fraction of the incremental revenues fall to the bottom 
line for shareholders. The banks have done a wonderful job at public relations. Everyone knows 
about the 20% incentive fees in the hedge fund and private equity industry. Nobody talks about 
the investment banks’ 50% compensation structures, which have no high-water mark and 
actually are exceeded in difficult times in order to retain talent”(Einhorn 2008:11). The report on 
the vast write-downs at UBS examines how the compensation structure directly generated the 
behaviour which caused the losses, as staff were motivated to utilise the low cost of funding to 
invest in subprime positions. As a result there were insufficient incentives to protect the UBS 
franchise for the longer term “it remains the case that bonus payments for successful and senior 
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international business fixed income traders, including those in the businesses holding subprime 
positions were significant. Essentially, bonuses were measured against gross revenue after 
personnel costs, with no formal account taken of the quality and sustainability of those earnings” 
(UBS 2008:42). 
 
V. REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
There was a widespread sense that this regulatory failure of financial markets could not be 
allowed to occur again. Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, usually a stalwart ally of 
President Bush, derided the lack of regulation that, in her view, allowed the financial crisis to 
erupt in the United States and seep toward Europe. She reminded the German public that the 
United States and Britain rejected her proposals in 2007 for regulating international hedge funds 
and bond rating agencies. "It was said for a long time, 'Let the markets take care of themselves,' " 
Merkel commented. Now, she added, "even America and Britain are saying, 'Yes, we need more 
transparency, we need better standards.' " Germany's finance minister, Peer Steinbrueck, said that 
the "Anglo-Saxon" capitalist system had run its course and that "new rules of the road" are 
needed, including greater global regulation of capital markets (Washington Post 28 September 
2008). A strong emphasis both in Europe and the United States was upon reforming executive 
compensation structures that encouraged excessive risk-taking, and aligning reward with long 
term value creation was another imperative.  
Yet in the middle of the financial crisis an indication of how entrenched the irresponsibility of 
the financial sector had become was the astonishing news that the surviving US financial 
institutions were preparing to pay 2008 end of year executive bonuses approximately equivalent 
to the billions of dollars of aid they had just received from Congress. While the US economy was 
collapsing around them, and the US public were becoming increasingly concerned how they 
might survive a severe recession, the executives of major banks seemed focused primarily on 
maintaining their bonuses. Horrified by so immediate a betrayal of the public intervention to 
assist the banks, Henry Waxman, the Chairman of the US Congress Committee on Oversight & 
Government Reform sent a letter to the CEOs of Bank of America, Bank of New York, Citi, 
Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, State Street Corp. and Wells 
Fargo: 
“Earlier this month, the Treasury Department announced plans to invest $125bn of taxpayer 
funds in nine major banks, including yours, as an emergency measure to rebuild depleted capital. 
According to recent public filings, these nine banks have spent or reserved $108bn for employee 
compensation and bonuses in the first nine months of 2008, nearly the same amount as last year. 
Some experts have suggested that a significant percentage of this compensation could come in 
year-end bonuses and that the size of the bonuses will be significantly enhanced as a result of the 
infusion of taxpayer funds.”  (Washington Post, 29 October 2008).  
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Waxman demanded data from the banks on the total compensation per employee from 2006 to 
2008 broken down by salaries, bonuses (cash and equity), and other benefits; the number of 
employees who were paid over $500,000 in total compensation and how this was structured; the 
total compensation paid to the ten highest paid employees; and all policies on bonus payments.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The attractiveness of the Anglo-American finance and governance institutions permeated with 
inequality and subject to recurrent severe market cycles and financial crisis is open to question as 
a model for universal applicability. Indeed the damaging consequences of the 2008 financial 
crisis will impact severely upon the world economy, and could well dislodge the faith that the 
market based governance system is the only rational and efficient one for the future. It is more 
likely that solutions will be found to pressing problems of equity, sustainability and innovation in 
a diversity of finance and governance systems, responsive to deeper and wider concerns than the 
self-interest of the executives who control corporations, financial institutions and hedge funds 
(Lazonick 2007). 
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VIII. TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1   Highest Paid CEOs of US public Companies in 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company 
 
 
CEO 
 
 
Salary 
 
Bonus & 
other options 
 
Stock & 
other 
options 
 
2006 Total  
Market 
Cap. 
(US bn) 
 
1 
 
Yahoo 
 
Terry Semel 
 
$250, 001 
 
$ 125 
 
$ 71, 410, 090 
 
$71, 660, 216 
 
$47 
 
2 
 
XTO Energy 
 
Bob Simpson 
 
$1, 208, 334 
 
$31, 229,525 
 
$27,052, 065 
 
$59, 489, 924 
 
$17.3 
 
3 
 
Occidental 
Petroleum 
 
Ray Irani 
 
$1,300,000 
 
$5,958, 639 
 
$45, 563,945 
 
$52, 822, 584 
 
$45 
 
4 
 
Merrill Lynch 
E. Stanley O’Neal  
$700,000 
 
$18, 875, 298 
 
$26, 800, 049 
 
$46,375,347 
 
$82 
 
5 
 
Danaher 
 
H. Lawrence Culp 
 
$1, 100, 000 
 
$3, 949,746 
 
$41, 165, 925 
 
$46, 375, 347 
 
$19.6 
 
6 
Country Wide 
Financial 
 
Angelo Mozilo 
 
$2, 866,667 
 
$ 21, 115, 639 
 
$19, 012,000 
 
$42, 994, 306 
 
$22 
 
7 
 
Ford 
 
Alan Mulally 
 
$ 666, 667 
 
$ 18, 834, 433 
 
$ 19, 627, 000 
 
$ 39, 128,100 
 
$14 
 
8 
 
Apollo Group 
 
Todd Nelson 
 
$ 281, 250 
 
$ 32, 345, 192 
 
$ 0 
 
$ 32, 626, 442 
 
$11.5 
 
9 
 
AT&T 
 
Edward Whitacre 
 
$ 2, 100, 000 
 
$ 7, 512, 964 
 
$ 22, 152, 797 
 
$ 31, 765,761 
 
$105 
 
10 
 
Altria Group 
 
Louis Camilleri 
 
$1, 750, 000 
 
$19, 909, 987 
 
$ 10, 909, 987 
 
$31, 677, 662 
 
$182 
      
Average 
 
$ 46, 375, 347 
 
 
Source: Institute for Policy Studies (2007). 
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Table 2   Highest Paid CEOs of European  Public Companies in 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company 
 
 
Country 
 
 
CEO 
 
2006 Total  
Market 
Cap. 
Euro bn 
 
1 
 
Renault 
 
France 
 
Carlos Ghosn 
 
$45, 500,000 
 
€17.5 
 
2 
 
L’oreal 
 
France 
 
Jean-Paul Agon 
 
$19, 300, 000 
 
€ 35 
 
3 
 
Unicredit Group 
 
Italy 
 
Alessandro Profumo 
 
$18, 100, 000 
 
€ 69.2 
 
4 
 
Vodaphone 
 
Great Britain 
 
Arun Sarin 
 
$15, 200, 000 
 
€ 894 
 
5 
 
Assicurazioni Generali 
 
Italy 
 
Antoine Bernheim 
 
$14, 200, 000 
 
€ 27.7 
 
6 
 
Deutsche Bank 
 
Germany 
 
Josef Ackerman 
 
$12, 400, 000 
 
€ 53.2  
 
7 
 
AXA 
 
France 
 
Henri de Castries 
 
$ 12, 100, 000 
 
€ 41.9 
 
8 
 
Total 
 
France 
 
Thierry Desmarest 
 
$ 10, 800,000 
 
$ 116 
 
9 
 
Societé Generale 
 
France 
 
Daniel Bouton 
 
$ 10, 700, 000 
 
€ 64.4 
 
10 
 
Banco Santander 
 
Spain 
 
Alfredo Saénz 
 
$10, 600, 000 
 
€ 88.4 
    
Average 
 
$ 16, 890, 000 
 
 
Source: Institute for Policy Studies (2007)  
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Figure 1 Composition of Median CEO Pay in the US 1980-2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hall B. J. (2003: 23) ExecuComp and data derived and spliced together from Hall and Liebman (1998), cited in footnote 1, and Hall and Murphy (2002), cited in footnote 17. The data from 1992 to 2000 are from S&P500 Industrial companies while the data from the earlier years are from a sample of Forbes 500 companies. 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Figure  2  Comparison of CEO and Worker Pay in the US 1990-2005 ( In 2005 dollars) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Institute For a Fair Economy (2006). 
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Table 3   Comparison of CEO Compensation and Ratio of CEO to Worker Pay 1998-2005 
 
 
 
 CEO compensation  Foreign pay relative to 
  
( $ Thousands) 
Percent 
change 
Ratio of CEO 
to worker 
U.S. pay, 2005  U.S. =100 
Country 1988 2003 2005 1988-2005 pay, 2005* CEO Worker 
 
Australia 
 
$180, 760 
 
$  737,162 
 
$  707,747 
 
292% 
 
15.6 
 
33% 
 
82% 
Belgium    383,718     739,700    987,387 157 18 46 99 
Canada    423,358     944,375  1,068,964 152 23.1 49 83 
France    404,331     780,380  1,202,145 197 22.8 56 95 
Germany    412,259  1,013,171  1,181,292 187 20.1 55 106 
Italy    342,492    893,035  1,137,326 232 25.9 53 79 
Japan    502,639    484,909     543,564 8 10.8 25 91 
Netherlands    396,403    716,387     862,711 118 17.8 40 87 
New Zealand     476,926    396,456 -- 24.9 18 29 
Spain    352,006    658, 039    697,691 98 17.2 32 73 
Sweden    234,670    743,160    948,990 304 19.2 44 89 
Switzerland    510,567  1,263,450  1,390,899 172 19.3 64 130 
United Kingdom    453,485    881,047  1,184,936 161 31.8 55 67 
United States    805,490 2,386,762 2,164,952 169 39.0 100 100 
        
Non-U.S. average    383,057   794,749    946,931 173 20.5 44 85 
* Ratio of CEO compensation to the compensation of the manufacturing production workers 
 
Source: Table 3.47 from Mishel Lawrence, Jared Bernstein and Sylvia Allegretto, The State of Working America 
2006-2007, an EPI Economic Policy institute Book, Ithaca, N.Y. ILR Press, an imprint of Cornell University Press, 
2008. 
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Figure 3 Distribution of Stock Market Holdings by Wealth Class 2004 
 
 
Source: Economic Policy Institute: The State of Working America 2006-2007  
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Figure 4        World Exchange Market Capitalization (US $trillion) 
 
 
 
Source: Blumberg 
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Table 4          Government Support for Global Financial Crisis 2008 
 
 
 USD 
Europe $ 1.8   trillion 
UK $  856 billion 
US $ 840 billion 
Sweden $ 205 billion 
South Korea $ 130 billion 
Australia $ 10.4 billion 
Rest of the world $ 105.12 billion 
Total 3.95  trillion 
 
Source: Compiled from 
BBC Credit Crisis: World in Turmoil http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7654647.stm,  
ABC News, Tuesday 21 of October, 2008. http://www.abc.net.au/ 
Reuters,http://www.reuters.com/article/forexNews/idUSTRE49J2GB20081020 
IMF Global Financial Stability Report October 2008 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/02/index.htm 
 
 
 
 
 
